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BY J. V. NASH
JOHN DEWEY, in Human Nature and Conduct, has presented a
theory of ethics which exhibits a relation to the older school of
morals somewhat analogous to that which the modernist movement
in religion bears to the traditional theological orthodoxies. Recent
tendencies in psychology are here applied to the problem of conduct,
and their implications thoroughly worked out. All supernatural
sanctions are discarded and morality grounded squarely on evolu-
tion, human nature, and the social environment.
The Deveian system is remorselessly scientific and pragmatic
;
yet it flowers in spiritual values, expressed in the idealism of self-
realization and human fellowship. The individual self merges into
the social, without loss of its own sovereignty and autonomy. John
Dewey seems to have performed the remarkable feat of bringing
William James, the pragmatist, and Josiah Royce, the idealist, to-
gether in a friendly handclasp, while H. G. Wells hovers in the
background, pronouncing benedictions out of God the hwisible King
and Alen Like Gods.
And yet, after all, the basis of the new ethics is not new ; it is that
of individual realization—or salvation, if you will—through fellow-
ship and service. He who of old said : "I have come to let them have
life, and to let them have it in abundance" (John x.lO) also declared
:
"H anyone wishes to be first, he must be the last of all and the serv-
ant of all" (Mark ix.35). And Paul accompHshed the synthesis of
the individual with the social in the words : "We are individually
parts of one another." (Rom. xii.5).^
Such was the message of another great religious teacher, de-
nounced as a heretic by modern orthodoxy—the late George Burman
Foster, who conceived the mission of religion to be "the formation
of free and independent personalities, and a kingdom of such person-
1 Quotations from the recent Goodspeed translation of the New Testament.
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alities, in which all are ends, and no one mere means, the relation-
ship among them to be one of mutual love and service." -
Such, too. was the lesson which Maeterlinck learned from the
bees,—the articulation of the individual in the life of the group; a
lesson through which he overcame the terror of death, and which
lighted the pathway to the new Romanticism of which he is the
prophet.
This is pretty close to Royce's vision of the Great Community,
on which his dying eyes rested in the midst of a war-torn w'orld :^
"Its members wall not be merely individual human beings, nor
yet mere collections or masses of human beings, however vast, but
communities of some sort. . . . Ethical individualism has been, in
the past, one great foe of the Great Community. Ethical individ-
ualism, whether it takes the form of democracy or of the irrespons-
ible search on the part of individuals for private happiness or for
any other merely individual good, will never save mankind. Equally
useless, however, for the attainment of humanity's great end would
be any form of mere ethical collectivism ; that is, any view which
regarded the good of mankind as something which masses or crowds
or disorganized collections of men should win. . . . Loyalty, the
devotion of the self to the interests of the community, is indeed the
form which the highest life of humanity must take, whether in a
political unit, such as in a nation, or in the church universal, such
as Paul foresaw. Without loyalty, there is no salvation."
Dewey aproaches the subject from the side of biology, psychol-
ogy, and sociology ; interpreting the accumulated results of research
in the fields of these sciences in terms of humanism and ethics.
The somewhat discursive treatment of his theme is explained
by the fact that the book grew out of a series of university lectures
delivered in California during the year 1918.
Moralists, says Dewey, have thought of human nature as essen-
tially evil because it resisted the yoke which they tried to place upon
it. "'Parents, priests, chiefs, social censors have supplied the aims,
aims which were foreign to those upon whom they were imposed
—
to the young, laymen, ordinary folk ; a few have given and adminis-
tered rule, and the mass have in a passable fashion and with reluct-
ance obeyed."
The morality of the theologians, according to Dewey, would seem
to be something akin to what Nietzsche called "slave morals." "Gen-
2 See The Open Court, June, 1922, and January, 1923.
'' The Hope of the Great Community, posthumous essays by Josiah Rove, 1916.
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erally speaking," he says, "good people have been those who did
what they were told to do, and lack of eager compliance is a sign
of something wrong in their nature." Thus, "men have turned
moral rules into an agency of class supremacy."
However, Dewey believes that there was in the beginning no
deliberate design to rule by imposing moral rules upon the masses.
He believes that ignorance of human nature and its rightful claims
is the primary cause of the false moral rules that have grown up.
The reason for this ignorance is that there was absolutely no scien-
tific knowledge of any kind. "Lack of understanding of human
nature is the primary cause of disregard for it."
He goes on to say : "A decline in the authority of social oligarchy
was accompanied by a rise of scientific interest in human nature."
Might it not be truer to the fact, however, to see in the rise of scien-
tific interest, with the coming of the Renaissance and the spread of
the new learning through the invention of printing, that which was
really the chief factor in the decline of social oligarchy and the birth
of democracy, which in turn opened the way for scientific inquiry
into human nature ? In other words, the advance of physical science
broke down rigid class barriers and prejudices, so that there could
be a free study of human nature.
Dewey states the purpose of his book as "a discussion of some
phases of the ethical change involved in positive respect for human
nature when the latter is associated with scientific knowledge."
His point is well taken wherein he shows that the separating of
morals from physiology and psychology has resulted in a conven-
tional goodness that is abnormal and pathological, because cut off
from living roots in human nature. "The badness of good people
... is the revenge taken by human nature for the injuries heaped
upon it in the name of morality." Thus we find people who are
"holy terrors." But such morality is usually negative, manifesting
itself in insipidity of character, sham "respectability." and down-
right hypocrisy. It is a "drab morality," in which one dreads to
be himself. Its great aim is avoidance of what is considered bad
form, and in observing prohibitions, rather than in positive action
that has ethical value.
He shows how the church, finding this system of morality un-
workable, has got around it. The Catholic Church, with its super-
natural morality, nevertheless allows many dispensations to the mul-
titude and concessions to the frailties of the flesh. It is only the
select few, who retire to monasteries, that attempt to live up to
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the church's ideal morality. Protestantism has accomplished the
same result by its emphasis upon "justification by faith," which
winks at "tlaily lapses into the gregarious morals of average
Conduct."
Dewey speaks of "those forceful natures who cannot tame them-
selves to the required level of colorless conformity." Their attitude
is usually unconscious, however, and "they are heartily in favor of
morality for the mass, as making it easier to manage them. Their
only standard is success, putting things over, getting things done.
Being good is to them practically synonymous with ineffectuality
;
and accomj)lishment, achievement, is its own justification. They
know by experience that much is forgiven to those who succeed and
they leave goodness to the stupid, to those whom they qualify as
boobs."
This certainly is much akin to Nietzsche's idea of the superman,
who is a law to himself, "beyond good and evil." This sort of char-
acter, however, according to Dewey, is very apt to degenerate into
hypocrisy, since men of this type usually pay tribute to established
institutions and are fierce "in their denunciations of all who openly
defy conventionalized ideals."
Another evil result of this false morality is that those who rebel
against it usually fly to the other extreme and identify freedom with
complete licentiousness, and think that the way to realize their indi-
viduality is by the most abandoned gratification of their physical
passions. "They treat subjection to passion as a manifestation of
freedom in the degree in which it shocks the bourgeois."
Again, those few who do take seriously the idea of morals sep-
arated from the actual facts of human nature are apt to become
'"spiritual egotists." He says that "their exaltation of conceit makes
them absolutely inhuman in their selfishness." "William James, in
his Varietifif of Reliaious Experience, cites some examples of this
type which bear out Dewey's statement.
In other cases, says Dewey, this ideal moral world becomes a
refuge from the real world, into which men retire from time to time,
sometimes offsetting the strain by "pleasurable excursions into the
delights of the actual." History, to be sure, records many cases of
irdivid"als who have lived in alternating periods of piety and de-
bauchery.
One '^^f the worst efifects of the separation of morals from human
nature, thinks Dewey, is that human nature is left without any guide
in the o-dinary relationships of business, civic life, friendship, and
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recreation. "In short, the severance of morals from human nature
ends by driving morals inwards, from the public, open, out-of-doors
air and light of day, into the obscurities and privacies of an inner
life."
This driving inward of morality results in "the almost complete
severance of ethics from politics and economics." The former is
regarded as summed up in edifying exhortations, and the latter as
connected with arts of expediency separated from larger issues of
good."
This explains why there are today two schools of social reform,
one based upon "the notion of a morality which springs from an
inner freedom, something mysteriously cooped up within personality,"
holding that the way to change institutions is for men to purify
their hearts. On the other hand, we have the school which main-
tains that "men are made what they are by the forces of the environ-
ment, that human nature is purely malleable, and that till institutions
are changed nothing can be done." It is the old problem of free will
versus determinism.
Neither of these views, Dewey believes, expresses the real truth.
He holds that there is an alternative. "All conduct is interaction
between elements of human nature and the environment, natural
and social. He believes that progress proceeds in two ways, and
that "freedom" is found "in that kind of interaction which main-
tains an environment in which human desire and choice count for
something." There are forces within man as well as outside, and
the problem of ethics is one of adjustment, intelligently attained.
Morals are not degraded by dealing with material things. Much
of the suffering and unnecessary slavery of the world, he thinks, is
due to the inherited belief that moral questions can be settled pri-
vately in our minds, apart from any practical application of knowl-
edge in industry, law, and politics.
This shows that Dewey would apply to ethics the pragmatic
method which William James applied to philosophy. In other words,
the test of the value of moral ideas is their result in practical action.
According to Dewey, this view of ethics will do away with the
dualism of which we have been speaking in morality. "It would put
an end to the impossible attempt to live in two unrelated worlds."
Again, it makes ethics a social, not an individual science, because "it
would find the nature and activities of one person coterminous with
those of other human beings, and therefore link ethics with the study
ot history, sociology, law, and economics."
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He does not claim that such a view of ethics would automatically
solve moral problems or make the moral life as simple as speeding
down a lighted boulevard. It would simply enable us to approach
moral problems with a constantly growing fund of knowledge based
on past experience.
In short, morals must be integrated with human nature, and both
with the environment. Then we shall have a science of ethics recog-
nizing the continuity of nature, man. and society, and which will be
(1) serious but not fanatical, (2) aspiring but not sentimental, (3)
adapted to reality but not conventional. (4) sensible but not profit-
seeking, (5) idealistic but not romantic.
Such a point of view brings morals down to earth, and "if they
still aspire to heaven, it is to the heavens of the earth, and not to
another world."
He then goes into an extended discussion of various factors
entering into human nature and conduct: (1) The place of habit in
conduct, (2) the place of impulse in conduct, and (3) the place of
intelligence in conduct.
Habits are compared to physiological functions like breathing
and digesting, though the latter are involuntary while habits are
acquired. Habits are social, for if an individual were alone in the
world he would not be able to form habits. Psychologists agree with
this ; a child allowed to grow up separated from all human contact
would not and could not develop a personality.
Dewey asserts that there is no such thing as "neutrality in con-
duct." "Conduct." he says, "is always shared," and so it is mean-
ingless to say that conduct ougJit to be social, for it necessarily is
social, whether good or bad.
Individuals come and go, but their habits endure ; therefore the
kind of world that our descendants will enjoy depends upon the
habits that we practice. Simply wishing for the abolition of war,
industrial justice, greater equality of opportunity for all, will not
bring them about. "There must be change in the objective arrange-
ments and institutions. We must work on the environment, not
merely on the hearts of men."
Desire, while a feeble thing, may set the ball rolling. "Every
ideal is preceded by an actuality ; but the ideal is more than a repe-
tition in inner image of the actual. It projects in securer and wider
and fuller form some good which has been previously experienced
in a precarious, accidental, fleeting wav." Thus, by occasionally
seeing wild flowers, man came to desire the beauty the flowers, and
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this led to cultivation of them making better flowers and in greater
abundance.
The essence of habit he believes, "is an acquired predisposition
to ways or modes of response." It means "special sensitiveness or
accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilection and
aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts. It means
will."
Although he rejects individualistic free will, he does hold that
environment binds the will.
Taking up "Character and Conduct," he discusses free will and
ideas of morality which have been widely accepted heretofore. Here
are two characteristic sentences
:
"A holiness of character which is celebrated only on holy-days is
unreal."
"A virtue of honesty, or chastity, or benevolence, which lives
upon itself apart from definite results, consumes itself and goes up
in smoke."
We must recognize that in a changing world old habits have to
be modified, no matter how good they have seemed to us. "Any
observed form or object is but a challenge," and so it is with our
ideals of justice, peace, human brotherhood, equality, or order. The
new psychology will assist "in breaking down of old rigidities of
habit and preparing the way for acts that recreate an environment.
He shows that customs are not formed by a consolidation of
individual habits but chiefly because individuals face the same situ-
ations and react in the same way. An individual usually acquires
the morality as he inherits the speech of his social group. This
seems verv evident. Certainly a man born in Turkey will acquire
different ideals of morality from one born in Presbyterian Scotland.
Dewey believes that we have been unfair to the helpless child in
forcing our beliefs upon it. "Education," he says, "becomes the
art of taking advantage of the helplessness of the young; the form-
ing of habits becomes a guarantee for the maintenance of hedges of
custom."
Customs, savs Dewey, have supplied the st indnrds o personal
activities : they "constitute moral standards." This seems to be true
:
the word moral itself is from the Latin "mores," which means cus-
toms, as in the famous exclamation of Cicero : "O tempora, o mores."
He criticises Westermarck for treating sympathetic resentment
and approbation as pure emotions giving rise to acts. He declares
that "feelings as well as reason spring up within action." It is
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breach of or fidelity to custom that excites in us sympathetic resent-
ment or approbation.
The chfiferent classes in society develop their own customs, which
are their working morals, and each class believes it is right ; but com-
merce, travel, communication, war, inventions in industry, etc., are
constantly breaking up the old customs ; "frozen habits thaw out
and all are mixed again."
It is so with nations and races. Today nations and races with
diflferent moral standards are facing each other. "The demand of
each side," he says, "treats its opponent as a wilful violator of moral
principles, an expression of self-interest or superior might." (This
was written in the year 1918.)
The discussion from there on is chiefly of psychological interest,
until we come to the chapter on "The uniqueness of Good." By
means of the true psychology, he believes, we have revealed to us
the nature of good or satisfaction. "Good consists in the meaning
that is experienced to belong to an activity when conflict a»id entan-
glement of various incompatible impulses and habits terminate in a
unified orderly release in action." In other words, good is a resolu-
tion of conflicting elements, resulting in an action that gives us satis-
faction. Many of our unifications, however, are merely temporary
compromises. The good is not a stereotyped, monotonous thing. On
the contrary, "the good is never twice alike. It never copies itself.
It is new every inorning. fresh every evening. It is unique in its
every presentation."
In the chapter on "The Nature of Aims," he shows the pernicious
effect of the idea of "fixed ends," which was the cornerstone of
orthodox moral theory. We do not shoot arrows because targets
exist, but we set up targets simply to make our shooting more sig-
nificant and effective, and we keep changing the targets. Making
motive or intention the touchstone of morals is equally futile. It
makes them an end. Dewev would do away with such "ends" com-
pletelv. Ends are in fact endless, "forever coming into existence
as new activities occasion new consennences." This he believes is
equivalent to saying that "there are no ends—that is, no fixed, self-
enclosed finalities."
In "The Nature of Principles." he crit'C'ses Kant's philosonhy in
certain particulars, but p'^vs tribute to the moral value of Kant's
famous rule of action, that the test of an act is whether an individual
would want to make it a tmiversal l^w. "Looked at in the light of
reason, everv mean, insincere, inconsiderate motive of action shrivels
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into a private exception which a person wants to take advantage of
in his own favor, and which he would be horrified to have others
act upon. . . . Kindly, decent acts, on the contrary, extend and mul-
tiply themselves in a continuing harmony."
In Desire and Intelligence he maintains that "impulse is primary'
and intelligence secondary and in some sense derivative." Recog-
nition of this fact, however, he thinks exalts intelligence, "for
thought is not the slave of impulse to do its bidding. Impulse does
not knows what it is after; it cannot give orders even if it wants to.
It rushes blindly into any opening it chances to find. Anything that
expends it satisfies it. . . . Intelligence converts desire into plans,
systematic plans based on assembling facts, reporting events as they
happen, keeping tab on them and analyzing them." On the other
hand, "nothing is so easy to follow as impulse, and no one is deceived
so readily as a person under strong emotion. . . . Impulse burns
itself up; emotion cannot be kept at its full tide."
In Part IV he states that conduct, when discussed under heads
like habit, impulse, and intelligence, gets "artificially shredded." He
now sums up the ethical problem. Very briefly, we see that morality
is not something static
—
it is a process. His leading conclusion is
that "morals has to do with all activity into which alternative pos-
sibilities enter. For wherever they enter, a difference between better
and worse arises."
He would apply the trial and error method to ethics. "All moral
judgment is experimental and subject to revision by its issue." Here
again we see the ethical pragmatist. He scorns the old traditional
school of morals which, while displaying anxious solicitude for a few
acts, gives most others "baths of exemption," so that "a moral mora-
torium prevails for everyday affairs."
;
Morals, he declares, "means growth of conduct in meaning. . . .
In the largest sense of the word, morals is education. It is learning
the meaning of what we are about and employing the meaning in
action." Again he hammers away at the idea of "fixed ideals." "If
it is better to travel than to arrive, it is because traveling is a con-
stant arriving, while that arrival which precludes further traveling
is most easilv attained by going to sleep or dying."
His empirical position is expressed again and again with the
greatest force. Progress means "extension of the significance found
within experience." We must not. however, expect such progress
to bring us immunity from perplexity and tro'ible. If lie were going
to make a categorical imperative like Kant, he would sav : "So act
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as to increase the meaning of present experience." Experience, then,
is our moral guide. But there can be no absolute imperative. Each
case must be acted upon on its own merits.
The business man compares today's liabilities and assets with yes-
terday's, and it should be so morally with the business of living.
He discusses the relation of evolution to ethics, and believes that
"the ethical import of the doctrine of evolution is enormous." Evolu-
tion means "continuity of change." The old fixed goal idea leads
to pessimism and the war showed the bankruptcy of our old ethical
standards. After all, man lives because he has the urge of living
and not because of philosophical reasons for living. Even the expe-
rience of trouble and failure is valuable in furnishing us instruction.
Humility is an aid to endeavor and we should prize every opportun-
ity of present growth.
What is perfection? He believes it means "perfecting, fulfil-
ment, fulfilling, and the good is now or never."
Plato. Aristotle, and Spinoza, made good and evil too much of
intellectual abstractions. I'tilitarianism was on a better scent but
put too much value into the future. Good must be made a matter
of social experience here and now.
Dewey's doctrine is not mere Epicureanism, which failed to con-
nect good with the full reach of activities. That is true, he main-
tains, of all theories based on the individual self. It is not the resi-
dence of experience that counts, but the contents of the house. We
must visualize a larger self and the way to help others is to give them
opportunity to enlarge and strengthen their personalities. He would
have us delivered from professional reformers and busybodies.
Since morals is concerned with everyday conduct, and "grows
out of specific empirical facts," he has no good word for "supernat-
ural commands, rewards, and penalties." Morals is a human thing;
'"it is that which is closest to human nature ; it is ineradicably empiri-
cal, not theological nor metaphysical nor mathematical." Moral sci-
ence is related to other sciences. He believes that even Spencer's
ethics was too Utopian.
However, he points out that morality "resides not in perception
of fact, but in the use made of its perception. . . . Perception of
things as they are is but a stage in the process of making them dif-
ferent." And so morality begins with the use of our knowledge of
natural law. and "use varying with the active system of disposition
and desires.''
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Conflict is the goad which stirs ns to observation and memory and
instigates us to invention, but social hostility is not the road to social
harmony. Darwinism has been perverted in making it appear to
sanction war and brutality of competition. On the other hand, we
should not profess smug satisfaction with things as they are, for to
do so is hypocrisy. We should recognize existing facts and use
them "as a challenge to intelligence to modify the environment and
change habits."
He believes that the road to freedom "may be found in that
knowledge of facts which enables us to employ them in connection
wth desires and aims." Freedom contains three chief elements: (1)
efficiency in action, ability to carry out plans, (2) capacity to vary
plans, to change the course of action, and (3) the power of desire
and choice to be factors in events.
We do not use the present to control the future, he says, but "we
use the foresight of the future to refine and expand present activ-
ities." It is in this use of desire, deliberation, and choice, that, for
Dewey, freedom is actualized.
Finally, in the last chapter, he emphasizes the fact once more
that morality is social. Our thinking is largely determined by fac-
tors outside our conscious mind. Our conscience is based on our
feeling for the opinion of our follows. Moral judgment and moral
responsibility are the work of the social environment and show con-
clusively that our morality is social. The actions of an individual
bear the stamp of his community just as does the language he speaks.
This is simply a statement of fact, without saying that it is right, as
when a man is socially admired just because he has made money.
Mere blame or approbation does not determine underlying ethical
values. "If the standard of morals is low, it is because the educa-
tion given by the interaction of the individual with hs social environ-
ment is defective."
The scientific study of human nature will give us the method and
materials for true judgments on human conduct. The development
of the science of hiunan nature is, therefore, a matter of prime im-
portance for a right understanding of ethics. Religion, he thinks,
has lost itself in cults, dogma, and myth, instead of being a sense of
the whole and a spontaneous thing. It has produced "an intolerable
superiority on the part of the few and an intolerable burden on the
part of the many."
Every act of ours must carry with it a sense of the whole to
which it belongs and wh.ich in a sense belongs to it : yet we are re-
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sponsible only for our own personal acts and are freed from the bur-
den of responsibility for the whole. His last sentences are sugges-
tive of Royce's idea in the "Great Community":
"Within the flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves
dwells a sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them. In its
presence we put off mortality and live in the universal. The life of
the community in which we live and have our being is the fit symbol
of this relationship. The acts in which we express our perception of
the ties which bind us to others are its only rites and ceremonies."
